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A N
EXAMINATION
OF THE
THIRD and *FOURTH*
LETTERS
TO A
Tory Member.

EXAMINATION

IN

THE

ARTS

AND

SCIENCE

OF

THE

UNIVERSITY

OF

THE

STATE

OF

THE



A N
E X A M I N A T I O N
O F T H E
T H I R D and F O U R T H
L E T T E R S
T O A

Tory Member.

Relating to the Negotiations for a
Treaty of Peace in 1709.

I N A
S E C O N D L E T T E R
T O
My Lord ***

Pax queritur Bello.

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be had an Examination of the two former
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EXAMINATION

OF THE

OFFICE OF THE

SECRETARY

OF THE

NAVY

AND

OF THE

ARMY



TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

BEFORE ME

THE

SECRETARY

OF THE

NAVY

My Lord,

I Must confess, it is not without much Reluctancy, that I put Pen to Paper again upon this Account; my natural Inclination to Unity dissuades me from having a Hand in any Thing that looks like Party, and the Duties of my Function call me away from Temporal Affairs; but still the Deference I owe to your Lordship's Commands prevails, because *Obedience is better than Sacrifice*; and I trust in your Goodness, that these my private Thoughts will not be expos'd to publick View. My last grew upon me in spite of all my Endeavours, to bring it into a shorter Compass, tho' so little is said in it to the Second Letter concerning *the Management of the War*, and these Two on *the Negotiations for a Treaty of Peace in 1709*. I much fear will oblige me to be no less tedious, notwithstanding all my Care to cut short, and pass over many Things, to which much might be said. This I shall also do, to avoid, as I have hitherto done, intermedling in the least, where Ministers of State, or other worthy Persons employ'd in the Government, are concern'd; all I have to say is only to the Author of the Letters, who seems so fond of himself, and yet furnishes us with nothing that may cultivate that great Opinion he would persuade the World to have of him.

him. I am not insensible, that he, and all those of his Kidney, are good at *Innuendo*, and will oblige a Man to mean whatsoever they please, tho' he be never so cautious in placing his Words; for whatsoever Crosses them is interpreted to be maliciously design'd against the Government. If a Man Bows going into a Church, he is Superstitious; if he opposes Atheism, he is Popishly affected; if he Names the King of *France* without railing, he is in the *French* Interest; if he thinks Passive Obedience a Virtue, he is for slavish Principles; if he questions the uncontrollable Prerogative of the People, and talks of a Divine Right in Kings, he is for the Pretender; if he speaks civilly of the new Ministry, that is railing at the old; if he but wishes for a Peace, one of the greatest Blessings upon Earth, that is, betraying his Country and the Liberties of *Europe*; if he does but lament his own Misfortunes under a general Decay of Trade, and other concomitants of a tedious War, that is, being a Grumbletonian, and one that is never satisfy'd under the blessed Circumstances of Starving; if in Christian Compassion, he feels some regret at the Effusion of so much Christian Blood, that is, Pusillanimity, Hypocrisy and Disaffection to the Cause; and if for quietness Sake he endeavours to carry himself even between both Extremes, then is he dubb'd a Trimmer, a Luke-warm Wretch, and fit to be spew'd out of Company. Thus, let a Man talk, look, tread, or even think a-wry, that is, never so little disagreeably

to those fiery Persons; nay, if he does not run full tilt with them, rail where they rail, and magnifie where they magnifie, he must expect no better Quarter than to be stigmatiz'd with the Titles of a Libeller, a prostitute Creature, a mercenary Wretch, an insolent Fellow, a Villain, and much more such significant Language, some of which we have already had in the two first Letters of *the Management of the War*, and shall meet with more in the other Two of *the Negotiations of Peace*, particularly in the Postscript to the first of these, concerning which I may chance to add a Word in that Place; for which Reason they ought to have been inscrib'd as a late Pamphlet was, *In usum Bellingsgate, for the Information of Porters, Carmen, Watermen, Oyster-Women, Orange-Women, &c.* My Aversion to the Task your Lordship has laid on me insensibly draws me away, yet I must comply; and to begin.

Pag. 1. of the first Letter, the Author there undertakes, to give a *fair and plain Account of what has been doing these Two Years, with respect to Peace*; and a little lower, tells us, *There is no Point the People are so uneasy at, or so much in the dark about, and consequently in which they can be so easily impos'd on by false Insinuations.* This *fair and plain Account* cannot but be suspected coming from such a Hand, and it would have been very proper to have inform'd the World from whence he had it; for, if the generality of People are so much
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in the dark, they will want to know how he came to be so enlightned. We have never heard that he was employ'd as Plenipotentiary, to be so thoroughly acquainted with all the Steps taken in that Affair; and if he has hapned to say Grace to some of those Ministers, it will hardly be believ'd they should lay themselves so open to him over their Meat; those Statesmen are generally more reserv'd, and sute their Table-Talk to their Company; and the Darkness the People are in as to that Point, is a sufficient Testimony of the Secrecy of those entrusted. But perhaps, Politicians may have impos'd on him, as Generals often do on Spies, letting drop Words, importing some Design they have not, to the end the conveying of that to the Enemy may the better conceal what they really intend. This perhaps may have given him some Glimmering, like an *Ignis Fatuus*, which he follows as a true Light, venturing at Precipices, and dragging through Hedges and Quagmires to attain his expected End. The easier he tells us it is to impose on the People, by reason of their Ignorance, the more cautious ought they to be in giving Credit to his pretended *fair and plain Account*; which, subsisting upon his naked Authority, can have no more Weight than his other Assertions, the Validity of some of which has been sufficiently expos'd in my last; and I question not, but this will further evince, how little Cause there is to rely in his bare Affirmative.

Pag. 2. labours hard to persuade, That the *Insinuations* above-mention'd come from those whose Interest it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late *M.* and the *D. of M.* which is prepossessing his Readers, That whosoever is inclinable to Peace, or desirous to be inform'd why it was not accepted of when offer'd upon such Terms, as they thought in their private Judgments might be Advantageous, are Slanderers and Revilers of those Noble Persons he points at; to the End, that their Imaginations, being thus fir'd with Indignation, against those who presume to defame Persons so lately in the highest Posts, they may be the less capable of distinguishing between Truth and Delusion. This is winding up the Passions, that they may run down with the greater Force to overpour Reason, and this Art is carried on.

Pag. 3. where the *French* and their King are represented like the vilest of Mortals. I am sensible, that is pleasing and agreeable to all those whom natural Prejudice has made averse to that Nation, yet it cannot be allow'd to be a generous or Christian Practice. To subdue Enemies is manly, but to revile them is mean and unbecoming great Minds. National Reflections are the most unpardonable, as involving Multitudes in a Defamation, no Man that is guilty of it can himself believe to be true. There is a respect due to crown'd Heads, which some People are utter Strangers to, whose only study is how to lessen their own Sovereigns and bring them into Contempt,

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and consequently they can never afford any King a better Title, than Usurper, Tyrant, Faith-Breaker, or some other no less infamous. I know I must expect the Character above hinted at, given by those who think railing at Potentates a Virtue; but that must not deter me from my Duty, good Manners can never be a Crime, tho' never so maliciously interpreted; and since we are commanded to love our Enemies, we may well afford them common Civility. It is a very rash Judgment that is grounded on Intentions; and yet we are told, the *French* are so far from keeping of Treaties, that they intend to break them at the very time they are making them. This is a general Charge, the particular Instance is the Treaty of *Reswick*, where they are again in general Terms, said, *Not to have executed a great Part of it, and to have executed other Parts of it in so Scandalous a Manner, as defeated in a great Measure the Intention of it.* Here it would have been proper to insert the Articles so broken and eluded, which we are left to find out, or else to take upon Trust. As for the verbal Part here mention'd, no Man I think will ever believe, That either King *William*, or the *Dutch*, after so many Conferences, and such tedious Debates as were about that Peace, would conclude upon any Thing that was not in Writing, sign'd and ratify'd; so that we have much reason to question the Truth of the Author's Dialogue, between *Mareschal Boufflers* and the *Earl of Portland*. He has taken Care, *Pag. 4.* to verifie what I have said above, by adding, That *Fault*
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will be easily forgiven the French King by some Men, for the Sake of a Correspondence which could not be so easily carried on, if the St. Germain's Court were remov'd farther of; that is, in other Words, Whosoever does not revile the French holds Correspondence at St. Germain's. Your Lordship perceives, how dangerous it is not to rail for Company, no less than being declar'd an Enemy to the Government, and holding Correspondence with its Enemies. Such is the Moderation of some Men, who make most use of that Word. I do not undertake to Apologize for the *French*, and must own my self wholly unacquainted with their Intentions, and no competent Judge of their Sincerity, both which the Letter-Writer so thoroughly understands; my Design is only to defend Reason and Charity.

Preliminaries it is likely, as is asserted, *Pag. 7.* may be requisite before *entring into any Conferences for a general Peace.* These Preliminaries, according to the natural Sense of the Word, all Men understand to be some previous Dispositions towards a Treaty, or Heads to Treat and Debate upon. Now, without entering into the Controversie for blaming or justifying the Proceedings of those entrusted, who, no doubt, acted according to their Instructions, and therefore could be liable to no Censure, to require of an Enemy all that can possibly be demanded of him in the greatest Rigour by way of Preliminary, I cannot but think is without any President, and seems to carry a Contradiction in it self;

for if all be not granted, no Treaty will be allow'd of; and if it be comply'd with, there remains nothing to be transacted in a Treaty. Who can expect that a Monarch shall divest himself of a vast Dominion, deliver up all his strong Holds, and leave himself Naked and Defenceless by way of Preliminary, to expect such other Conditions of Peace as his Enemies shall afterwards prescribe? But we are told, the *French* are deceitful, and never intend to perform what they Promise; if they are so, of consequence they must be the more Jealous of those who lay this Infidelity to their Charge. *The Allies on the other side are all Honour, and were never known to violate their Words*; Whether the *French* be of that Opinion or no is still a question, and either way, it can never be suppos'd, that a Prince, who is still able to bring an Army into the Field, will rather choose to rely on the Courtesie of his Enemies, than once more try the Chance of War, which is well known to be so uncertain, that often, by an unexpected Accident, the greatest Powers have been brought down to nothing, and the most Despicable have been rais'd up to the highest Pitch of Fortune. *Hannibal*, after repeated Victories, made his Way to the Gates of *Rome*, and yet the *Romans*, rousing out of their Consternation, not only sav'd their City and *Italy*, but drew him back into *Africk*, overthrew his conquering Army, and subdu'd his Mistress Commonwealth, the City of *Carthage*. The *Gauls* had before gone further, and
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taken the City, so that nothing remain'd to compleat its Ruin but the taking of the Capitol; yet, by a surprising Change, *Camilus* routed them, and rescu'd his Country. It is needless to go into Foreign Countries for Instances of this kind, where we might find infinite Numbers, our own furnishes us with many, and among them those of our Two warlike Kings *Edward III.* and *Henry V.* are remarkable, against the same Enemy *France*, which they so far over-run, as to Entail the Title upon their Posterity; and yet, How little besides that bare Title soon after remain'd in their Possession?

Another grievous Charge laid to the *French* in the same Page, is, That before the Conferences at the *Hague*, they had prievously been feeling the Pulse of the *Dutch*. This to me seems to be a Crime might be easily forgiven them, without any great Reproach. Nature ever dictates all that may tend to Self-Preservation; and if they, being hard set on all Sides, labour'd to throw off Part of the Weight that help'd to bear them down, I cannot think it is any more than what the most generous of the Allies would have done under the like Circumstances. And I well remember at that time, the *Dutch* were foully suspected to be very far engag'd; and it was thought some powerful Charms, such as lead those People any Way, prevail'd to draw them off again.

Pag. 9. We have a curious politick Flourish upon the Wisdom of Her Ma——y's Choice, in these Words, *'Tis but an odd way for a Party to express their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they adore, to ridicule the Choice she has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confess, is no Part of the Prerogative, tho' it seems to be growing fashionable of late with these Men, to think, or rather say so ; which makes it the more extraordinary for them to censure Her M——y so freely as they do, &c.* This is sheer Wit, a two edg'd Sword, and will serve to cut every way. The one is a Ridicule upon the divine Right of Sovereigns, upon Passive Obedience, upon the Respect due to Crown'd Heads, as appears by *implicite Admirers of Her M——y's Royal Wisdom ; a Sovereign they tell you they adore ; Infallibility.* The other is a Charge upon those very Men, as if they presumptuously condemn'd her M——'s Conduct, which we have in these Words, *for them to censure Her Majesty so freely as they do.* How ingeniously are the Non-Resistance Men here at once derided and upraided. *Infallibility, he confesses is no part of the Prerogative, tho' it seems to be growing fashionable with those Men to think, or rather to say so ;* Here he drives the Sarcastm Home, as if those Men he speaks of would carry the Kingly Prerogative so high as to make it infallible ; when on the other Side it is well known there is a Race of Men that would allow the Crown no Prerogative at all, they are either for a Titular Precarious Prince, or rather for none at all, as has been

been long and is still verify'd by all their Words and Actions. It is their peculiar Prerogative to revile Majesty, but if any one of those who are not for dethroning it, do but suggest the least Dislike of any Person in Authority, they will be the first that shall expose them as dissaffected and disrespectful. One considerable Part of this Gentleman's four Letters on War and Peace has been exclaiming against the little Change that has been made in the Ministry, he thinks every thing must needs go wrong on that Account; the D. of M—— he complains has been ill us'd, in so much that, he owns in his Fourth Letter p. 64. *He is afraid he is not likly to do so much at this time, when he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, &c.* Let him now look back to what he has said of the others censuring Her M——y, and consider how far he has out done them in that Point, and how little of that Modesty he practises, which he said is wanting in them.

We now enter upon a long Detail of the whole Treaty at the *Hague*, which is deliver'd to us, not only as if the Writer had been a Plenipotentiary, and taken Notes at every Conference, but with his usual Penetration, like one that saw into the very Hearts and most secret Designs of the *French* discovering every Thought and every cunning Design of theirs; the chiefest whereof he tells us, p. 12. was *To ensnare the Maritime Powers, if they could, and draw them into a base Design of sacrificing the Interest of their Allies to their own.* It is not improbable

ble the *French* might have such a View, and I believe no Man of Sense can blame them for it, since it so much concern'd them to break the Confederacy, if possible, and endeavour to satisfy one or two, rather than part with so much to satisfy all. Nor had they Cause wholly to despair of Success, who could remember that but a very few Years before, those Maritime Powers had actually concluded a Peace with them, notwithstanding the Opposition made on the Part of the Emperor, who had a Time assign'd him to come into it, or in case of Refusal to stand by himself.

Pag. 13. *No body had ever doubted, but that there was such an Understanding between the French King and his Grandson, that the Former could oblige the Latter to resign the Spanish Monarchy whenever he pleased.* Here is an absolute Authoritative Assertion upon the Opinions of Mankind without asking the Consent of the major Part, for it may very well be suppos'd he concluded of all by his own Notion of the thing, or at best by the Belief of some that thought like him. It's well known the Difference is very great between giving and taking away; every Man is ready to receive whatsoever is for his Conveniency and Advantage; but it is rare to find any inclinable to part with it, even to the Donor. A Father often settles on his Son, without any Instance of Refusal in such Cases, and yet I believe it will be no less difficult to produce an Example of any that has consented to a Resumption, or freely resign'd such Settlement. And such Resumption

sumption is much more unlikely in Case of a Crown, which is supported by Power, and the Possessor will scarce be perswaded to quit without Compulsion. The *French* we are told p. 14. answer'd to this effect, and thereupon the Author runs his Descant at Pleasure, little worth regarding, and p. 16. puts the Case, *which is more reasonable, for France to trust the Allies, or the Allies France?* which he says, *cannot be a very hard Question;* and indeed it is easie enough, for without all doubt, whatsoever real Reasons there may be to the contrary, Partiality will so far prevail on all Men, as to think it more reasonable to be trusted, than to trust; and no doubt but the most faithless Person, will for the same Reason rather urge another ought to confide in him, than he to put his whole Fortune into the Hands of a most sincere and honest Dealer; and this much more among Sovereigns, who have no Courts to sue in for their Right, but must depend upon the Decision of the Sword, which therefore they will never be prevail'd with to lay down, and commit their Titles to the Disposal of the most generous Enemy. Now to whom do's he put this Question, for a Question ask'd must be answer'd by somebody, or it stands for nothing; if he puts it to the *French*, it is plain they will answer partially for themselves, and that he will not allow of; if to the *Allies*, he has answer'd for them and the *French* will not stand to it. Thus either way the Question is impertinent, as is

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much more of the Argument, to pass by all which,

Pag. 17. is very remarkable for this unaccountable Sentence, *Besides it must be own'd there is a great Probity, Plainness and Honesty both in the Dutch and Germans which appear in all the Affairs of Common Life.* What a wonderful Discovery have we here of a thing that has been so long unknown to the World. *The Probity, Plainness and Honesty of the Dutch.* This is certainly his own Thought, he could never borrow it, for in my little Reading, I cannot call to Mind that ever I met with it before, he should have added their *Religion* to compleat the Character; and have sent us to *Japan* to enquire about it, if we could find no satisfactory Information nearer. *Punica fides* grew into a Proverb among the *Romans* and has been in the latter Ages frequently apply'd to that honest Nation, so much resembling the *Carthaginians*, that another great Man speaking of them said, *delenda est Carthago.* There is scarce any corner of the World that has not furnish'd us with Instances of their *Probity, Plainness and Honesty*, witness *Ambony, Polloroon, Sumatra, Bantam* and many other Places in the *East-Indies*; *Guiana, Surinan*, and others in the *West*; their Behaviour towards their Patroness Queen *Elizabeth*, the Fishery in our own Seas, and infinite other Instances, which I have not Leisure nor Inclination to repeat, nor should I take the least notice of them were they not publickly known to all Mankind.

Pag. 19. furnishes us with another Argument against the *French* as pertinent as his former ; and is, That they meant nothing less than the Restitution of *Spain*, because the War was carried on vigorously by the Duke of *Anjou* in *Spain*. One would think this Gentleman had never heard, that Princes generally make Peace with Sword in Hand, and improve all the Advantages they can gain during a Treaty to make the Conditions the easier. Besides, the *Spaniards*, carrying on the War so vigorously, show'd, That whatsoever the King of *France* transacted in *Holland*, they would not submit to it, if in Prejudice of their King ; and this was a farther Demonstration, that the recalling of that Prince was not so easie as the Letter would represent it. Much to the same Purpose is the mention of the Prince of *Asturias*, being acknowledg'd Presumptive Heir of *Spain*, *Pag. 20.* which was a Confirmation of the Affection of the *Spaniards* to their King, and no Act of the *French*, as their Ministers answer'd. Another heinous Crime is charg'd upon the *French* King, *Pag. 23.* and is, His endeavouring to gain the Affections of his own Subjects, by proposing a Treaty of Peace ; in other Places he is such a Tyrant, that he carries all by Dint of Violence and Oppression ; and yet here he is no less than Unjust and Perfidious, for using Means to gain his People's Affections, because so successful as to compass it.

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How shall we do to understand this Gentleman, or reconcile him to himself? He has told us all along, That the *French* were insincere, and never could be brought to any Thing the Allies could accept of in order to a good Peace, and therefore their Proposals were rejected; and yet now, when he comes to the breaking up of the Conferences, after the *French* Ministers had offer'd all they thought reasonable, or were empower'd to propose, he tells us first, *Pag. 24.* That when they had declar'd their Departure in the Morning, the Allies expected they should alter before Night; but when that was come, and no Change in them, *Pag. 25.* *The D. of M—— sent to the Pensioner, and the other Ministers, to desire a Meeting, to try once more if any Thing could be done to save the Treaty;* nay, this failing, *He would not give over all Hopes of having one Interview more, to which end he got to Brussels, as soon almost as Monsieur Rouille who was gone before.* What Connection is there between these two Accounts? The one informs us, the *French* would not come to any Terms that could be admitted by the Allies; and the other, that as soon as they were gone, there was nothing but posting after them. They had offer'd all that was in their Power, and were rejected, as bidding too little, and yet so much Anxiety to fetch them again when it was too late. It is certain, they would not have gone without proposing the utmost, and to send after them to ask more must be to no Purpose. On the other hand,

hand, if the Allies were for coming to their Terms, they could not be so unreasonable, as our *Negotiator* imagines. Thus we plainly see, he knows nothing of what he writes as Fact, but only delivers his Notions of Things as he fancies they were or might have been; which, if it does but serve to amuze and gull the unwary, is enough to serve his turn; and if any should happen to penetrate into the Art of Invention, he may still Hope to gain the Reputation of a Political Romancer. However, to put the better Colour upon the Fiction, he assures us, *Pag. 27.* That what he gives is *a plain and true Account of these Negotiations.* The History of Don *Quixote* bears the Title of a True one, and so do many other Books of that Sort, which yet gives them never the better Authority.

I am very sensible, the Author of the Letters, and all his Adherents, should they see what I am now Writing, would not fail to set me off with all the Titles of Jacobite, Papist, Favourer of the *French*, and many of a full grosser Nature, if any such may be found; and yet in spite of all their Courtesie, can I not forbear taking Notice, with what earnestness he presses King *Philip's* holding of *Spain* to be a violent Usurpation, and well known to be such both to his Grandfather and himself. I shall not pretend to assert his Title, but methinks this Author has the least reason in the World to oppose it. 'Tis his, and the Doctrine of his Friends, That all Power is originally in the People, who have the Right of making
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and unmaking of Kings, as they see expedient and for their publick Good. Now this King *Philip*, or this Duke of *Anjou*, it is most evident was call'd in, receiv'd, and is supported by the People of *Spain*, who have most signally shown their Zeal for, and Affection to him in the greatest Trials; so that if the whole Right of disposing of Crowns be in the People, he seems to stand as fair for it as any Man. Thus much I have offer'd to show how inconsistent some Men are with themselves; for if the People of *England* have such a Right, as has been sufficiently inculcated of late, it may be rationally suppos'd, that the People of all other Nations have the same, unless he will make out that the Sovereignty of the Universe is in the People of *England*, and that they only have the Authority of choosing Kings for themselves and for all other Nations. And now to evince how little I think this Argument makes for the Right of King *Philip* or Duke of *Anjou*, I do positively declare it to be my Opinion, That if he has no better Right than what he derives from the People, that is as little as the Letter-Writer can wish him. That Query is follow'd by others as impertinent, *viz.* *Is it not kept plainly for the Use and Benefit of the Giver? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him, &c.* He very well knows the Answer must be Negative; and we have told him, the *Spaniards* accepting of the Second Grandson is a Demonstration they never intended it for the use of the Grandfather, and they would rather call in all the

the Allies to their Assistance, than be impos'd upon in that Point ; and to say, the Giver has Power to take, has been before made out to be ridiculous ; and whatsoever plausible Colour he endeavours to put on it, I cannot believe all the Artifice in the World can ever persuade a Grandfather to be himself the Ruin of his Grandson.

Next follows an almost inextricable Knot of Queries and Suppositions, which all tend to make out, That the having a Peace with *France* would no way forward the Reduction of *Spain*, and the *French* giving up of strong Towns would be no Advantage to us ; which is so wild and extravagant a Notion, as none but himself could be guilty of. Just before we were told, That the Duke of *Anjou* could not hold *Spain* unless supported by his Grandfather ; and now, the leaving of him to himself, or only affording him some private Supplies of Money, and some few Men by way Desertion, makes the Matter more difficult than ever it was, when he employ'd his whole Power to maintain him in the Throne. He would persuade us we should be nothing the better for having several strong Towns put into our Hands by way of Treaty, and yet the taking of those same Places by force, at an immense Expence of Treasure, and with the Loss of many Thousand Lives, is of the greatest Moment ; so that to have the same Places for nothing is not so Beneficial as when dearly Bought. This is strong Reasoning, and yet not all ; for if
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those Towns were given, *Holland* would be so full of Care for its new Frontier, that it would not attend the War. I would gladly know of him, How they provide for those Places now they are gain'd by Conquest, and yet pursue the War? Would it not be easier for them to secure that Barrier when they had no Enemy to fear on that side, than it is now they have every Year a potent Army against them in the Field. But then suppose, says he, The Duke of *Savoy*, or King of *Prussia*, fall off from the Grand Alliance; and the very next Period, suppose they do not fall off, take it which way you will, *We shall have no War on the Rhine, or in Savoy, when Peace is made, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all executed, and there is no more Enemy to molest them, no Cause of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left.* Can any Thing be more absurd than what this Man pesters the World with? To what purpose is all this Rhapsody, Would he have the Allies make War in *Savoy*, and on the *Rhine*, against no Enemy, when they have had all they demanded? I cannot dive into the meaning of this Jargon, unless it be that he is troubled to think the Allies, when they had made a Peace with *France*, and got all they could by Treaty, would not then fall upon that King by surprize, and strip him of what little he had left. If he does not mean this, he means nothing, for to make War after a Peace concluded, and all Articles perform'd, can have no other meaning.

Pag. 38. If they (the French) make a Peace, they may disband 60 or 80000 Men, or more; and what shall hinder these Men from going into Spain to seek their Bread? Were this Gentleman willing to remember what he writes, he might easily call to Mind he had before answer'd this Question himself, in his first Letter of The Management of the War, Pag. 25. where he told us, That Spain is not able to support its own Inhabitants, much less an Army of Foreign Troops; and his Proposal there was but for 20000 Men. If the Case be so, Why does he now with such Ease send 60 or 80000 to seek their Bread, where he says there is none, or not enough to subsist the Natives. This looks like a Contrivance to destroy so many thousand French without fighting; or else he supposes, the French, who are so much nearer Spain than we, are not let into the Secret, that there is no Subsistence for them there; and if it be so, still this mighty Army will be able to do the Spaniards no other Service, than to help them to Starve the sooner. This must be a necessary Consequence, if what he asserted in the Place above-mention'd were true; but if these Men could subsist, then has he destroy'd all the Reputation of his said first Letter, and the carrying on the War in Spain is not so impracticable as he would there represent it. Let him take which Handle he pleases, he will find himself at a Loss to reconcile these Contradictions, and all Men will see how grossly he endeavours to impose on them. It is a true saying, That those who

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would Deceive others with Untruths ought to have good Memories, lest they be catch'd Tripping, and then all their Forgeries fall to the Ground.

Pag. 42. repeats the same Nonsense above taken Notice of, which is, requiring a greater Army and Expence for maintaining the Towns given up by Treaty, in time of Peace, than for keeping them, and extending our Conquests in Time of War: His Words are these; *Nay, considering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all must have Garisons in them, and those not very small Ones, to keep their new Subjects in Awe, we should want a greater Army in Flanders than before, to be in a Condition to Act offensively.* There has been more taken than ever the French offer'd to give, as he owns himself, *Pag. 43.* where he says, they always excepted *Doway*. Why then is it so much easier to keep more Towns taken by Force than fewer surrendered by Treaty. It is amazing, that Men, who pretend to Politicks, should publish such undigested Fancies, without considering how much they expose themselves to the Scorn and Laughter of all Creatures that can distinguish betwixt Sense and Nonsense.

Now for Strength of Argument, *Pag. 44.* Now suppose the Allies would have departed from it, (the 37th Article) could he (the French Minister) have sign'd the rest? No. Positively answer'd; and I may with better Reason ask him, Did Monsieur Rouille ever tell you he could not, or communicate his Powers to you? and Answer my self with

with much better Authority, No. For most certain it is he did not; and then how should this Man be able so readily to put in the Negative for him? Then the rest of his Proof is, *We may easily guess; 'tis probable; who knows; supposing*: Wonderful convincing! And after all this guess Work; then for the Positive again; *The first Thing to be done was the Surrendering of Mons, Namur, and Charleroy*—— but we are sure it would not have been done at all. This Man is certainly a Prodigy, either of Infatuation, or Assurance, or both; for I cannot find we are sure of any Thing that depends upon the Will of another; unless we allow him that Infallibility which he will not allow the Sovereign. Then for Politicks; *It is the Opinion of some knowing Men, that the Concessions France has seem'd to make in other Articles, were never intended to be executed.* These knowing Men, we may, as he does in other Cases, suppose, are himself and his Gang; for the generality of Mankind are not so sharp and quick-sighted, or perhaps, not so rash in their Judgments.

To conclude the first Letter, the Author tells us, *Pag. 48.* that is, the best Account he can send his Friend, who he flatters himself will be content with it, considering the Secrecy with which Affairs of this Nature are, or ought to be transacted. Considering that Secresie he talks of, I say, neither his Correspondent, nor any other rational Man, can have Cause to believe one Word of what he has said; for as a

Secret he could know nothing of it, and as no Secret, all that was not such has been long since made Publick. Thus let his first Letter go for a Romance, which is the best Name we can give it, and indeed, but a very poor One, that we may proceed to the Second.

But before we part with this, one Word to the Postscript, a Piece so shameful, that it has out-done all the Contents of the Three Letters, and yet there is foul Language enough in them; but here in Nineteen short Lines of an *Octavo* Page we have a Collection of *Belinsgate* Discourse, more becoming an Oyster-Woman than a Reverend Author. In that short compass, the *Examiner* is dubb'd a prostitute Writer, a mercenary Scribler, an Insolent, a Libeller, and almost a Villain. He has given the Answer such filth deserves in *Examiner*, N. 29. and it is needless for me to undertake the Cause of a Person so much abler than myself. Yet I cannot but take Notice of the most unreasonable Pretence on which the *Negotiator* lets fly so much Dirt at the *Examiner*, which, as he tells us, is for calling the Duke of M——, *A Catiline at the Head of a mercenary Army*. The Words indeed are in the Paper quoted, that is, the *Examiner*, N. 4. but the Application is certainly the proper Thought of the Author of the Postscript, who certainly deserves all the Reward the Law can bestow on such as Slander great Men; for to adapt base Characters, at so vast a Distance, to any peculiar Persons, is the worst of Defamation;

mation ; and could it have enter'd into the *Examiner's* Thoughts, to have aim'd that at the D. of *M——*, of whom I always find him speaking with the greatest Honour and Respect, the other must have been still more Criminal for uttering that so plain, which might have otherwise been unperceiv'd by the greater Part of Mankind. I have often shewn this Writer dives into the most secret Recesses of human Hearts, to fetch out their most private Thoughts and Designs ; it is therefore no wonder he should be so well acquainted with the Meaning of the *Examiner*, who can tell us whatsoever is transacted in the closest Conferences, and what is intended by the Allies, and by their Enemies.

We come now to the last Letter, which is divided into three Parts ; the first, From Monsieur *Rouille's* return to Monsieur *Petkum's* Journey to *Paris* ; the second, From that Time to the Arrival of the *French* Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg* ; and the last, During their stay there. Most of this Letter is Narrative, either of True, or Supposititious Facts, which I cannot pretend to be so intelligent in those Affairs as to disprove, and therefore shall be the more brief, as keeping close to my Method all along ; that is, not to make my self more knowing in Secrets than I am, nor presume to Censure or Judge of those entrusted in the Government ; but only to expose the Weakness and Incongruity of these so much applauded Letters. Besides, in this last, there is so much of the same, or so very like the Matter of the others, that to be particular to many Points of it, would of necessity require Repetition, and consequently be Impertinent rather than Entertaining.

The Letter then begins, *Pag. 2.* with the Offer made by *France*, That the King should not directly

nor indirectly assist his Grandson : Pursuant to this Pag. 4. he withdraws all his Forces out of *Spain*. This, any indifferent Person, who could not see into the Hearts of Men, would have thought look'd like a Disposition towards performing what was offer'd ; but our sharp-sighted Author perceives it was just the contrary, and assures us, it was only to disable himself from delivering up any cautionary Towns in *Spain* if they had been demanded. Thus it appears, That whatsoever that Prince designs is discover'd by the wonderful Sagacity of this Writer : If the *Spaniards* act vigorously whilst a Treaty is a-foot in *Flanders*, that shows the *French* never intend to perform what is propos'd ; if they withdraw their Forces, that is, because they will not deliver up the strong Towns. So that whether they have Troops in *Spain*, or no Troops, they are still in the wrong. Nor is this all, we shall find it a difficult Task to understand by the Account here given, whether he withdrew, or did not withdraw ; for Pag. 4. says, *He withdrew his Troops out of the Kingdom, yet kept them there all the Summer to be at hand to assist the Duke of Anjou* ; so they were there and not there, they were to assist the Duke of *Anjou*, and yet the Marshal *Bezons* being expostulated with for not assisting him, produc'd the King's Orders to justify himself. Nay, this is not all, we were told, Pag. 6. That the *French* King withdrew his Troops out of *Spain* to make his own People and the Allies believe he was sincerely for Peace ; and the very next Lines inform us he wanted those Troops in *Flanders*, which implies something more than Pretence and Sham. But here is a whole Chain of Contradictions ; for tho' that King wanted his Troops in *Flanders*, he contriv'd as many of them should desert as would make 7 or 8 Batallions, and sent all the Walloon Regiments out of *Flanders*

into Spain. He wanted his Troops, and made them Desert, and sent others in the Place of those that did not Desert: Let any Man read the Letter and judge, whether it be possible to pick Sense out of this Medley; and yet so blind is Prepossession, That such a huddle of Confusion is applauded and cry'd up as irresistible Argument. And to confirm the want of these Troops in *Flanders*, many of them that were so withdrawn were kept in *Roussillon*, to be ready to return to Spain.

Pag. 7. and 8. *The next best Expedient was to put into the Hands of the Allies some French Towns on the Frontier of Spain, such as Bayonne and Perpignan, which would have enabled the Allies to send Forces to Spain with infinitely less Expence and Trouble, and in a quarter of the Time they can now.* The French answer, *That it did not Suit either with the Safety or Dignity of France to put the Keys of the Kingdom into the Hands of the Allies, &c.* Surely, this cannot be thought a very unreasonable Answer; but whatsoever may be thought of that, let us see, how much this Project of the Author's would facilitate the Conquest of Spain, which we were before told could not maintain an Army, nor furnish Mules to carry Provisions. We must suppose the Forces to be landed at *Bayonne*, and whither must they March next? If into *Biscay*, that is the barrenest, poorest, and most mountainous Part of Spain, then what will become of them, when we are told, they cannot live in the best: If into *Navarre*, that is not much better than the other, and they must pass the *Pyreneans*. For *Arragon*, the same Mountains are in the Way, and so all along the Frontier. And what was to be done with *Perpignan*. If it was propos'd to go thither by Sea, that is farther off than *Barcelona*. If by Land, from *Bayonne* the March

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is about 80 Leagues all through *France* ; so that the *French* must not only give up those two Towns, but all the Country between them ; and when there, our Forces have more Difficulties to surmount than from *Barcelona*. These Blunders, our Letter-Writer is so far from regarding, that he goes on in his old Way of contradicting himself, at *Pag. 9.* where after, answering for the Allies, That they would certainly restore those Towns as soon as their Business were done, he adds, They could not be able to keep them ; because, *If the Allies had never so much Justice on their side, they could not long support themselves under the mighty Disadvantages with which they must make War on this Frontier ; of which you may judge by what I have said in my first Letter, which with little Alteration, will hold here.* Just before, the Delivery of those Towns made all Things easie for the reducing of *Spain* ; and now, all on a sudden, the Allies cannot be able to support themselves in them under the mighty Disadvantages mention'd in his first Letter. Saying and Unsaying is his common Practice ; he allows his Reader no Memory or Sense to put these Things together. When a Thing makes for his Turn, nothing is more easie, when the same is against him it is altogether impracticable.

We will pass by the Author's airy Notions of cautionary Places in *Alsace* and *Flanders*, his Bundle of Queries, *Pag. 12.* and *13.* his Reflections on the Battel of *Taniers*, *pag. 14.* his Apprehensions of the *French* Ministers, poisoning the Minds of the People against their Governours, *pag. 14.* his thorough Knowledge of the Letters written by Count *Bergheyck* and Monsieur *Torcy*, to the D of *M.* and abundance more of the like Stamp for I must draw to a Conclusion, yet cannot but observe, *pag. 20.* will have the *Fundamental Article*

les, not only agreed on, but executed, before the general Treaty is concluded. This is indeed a new Way of treating, it is knocking a Man down first, and when your Foot is upon his Belly, admitting him to Parley; it is hanging of him first and then trying him afterwards. What Mortal ever heard that a Treaty should be executed before it is concluded? How much fitter, were this Person, who abounds in such profound Expedients to be a Plenipotentiary than a Chaplain? What would not the French give to gain such a thorough pac'd Politician, to manage their Treaties for them, and keep their Secrets; for what can be more surprizing than what he tells us, *Pag. 21. Mr. Ibberville was sent to Madrid, where he communicated his Business to none but the King himself, and no Judgment could be made what his Errand was; yet this Sage of ours, from whom nothing can be conceal'd, by meer Strength of Reason, has found, it was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Lesson how to manage, with Assurances that his Grandfather would never forsake him.* What more could he have told us, had he made a third Man with Mr. Ibberville and King Philip, for he vouchsafes in this Place to call him King, and but 8 Lines after unking and dubs him Duke again.

Pag. 22. To give the World a small Specimen of his good Nature, as he has done so many of his Abilities, he says, *If this King (of France) were not a perfect Master in all Arts and Methods of Deceit, as great an Enemy as he is, I should be almost tempted to pity him; to see how hard a Game he has to play.* Prodigious Excess of Generosity, that he could almost be tempted to pity him. What greater Calamity could the most implacable of his Enemies wish that Monarch, than to see him reduc'd so low as to be pity'd by so inconsiderable a Creature?

Pag. 26. takes Notice of the French King's giving the Title of Duke of Anjou to the D. of Burgundy's Second Son, which was an Indication, he resolv'd to insist upon his Grandson's having the Title of King Philip gi-

ven him in the next Conferences, &c. — If therefore the Name of King was to remain to him, 'twas intended a Kingdom should do so to. I cannot conceive why any Mystery should be made of this Affair, by one who is so particularly inform'd in every Point relating to the Conferences, when all the World has seen, in the Post-script to the Post-Man, July 25. 1710. The Extract from the Register of the Resolutions of the States General, on Wednesday, July 23. 1710. wherein mention is several times made of a Partition, and of giving Sicily and Sardinia to King Philip, which seems never to have been rejected by the Dutch, who only insisted upon having Spain and the West-Indies put into the Hands of King Charles by the French, in case that Partition were agreed on. The Negotiator, who traces every private Step of these Affairs, might have taken Notice of one so publick as this, to save making so much Noise about the Title of Duke of Anjou, which the Grandfather might well bestow on another, when no Objection was made against leaving his Grandson King of Sicily and Sardinia, if he were depriv'd of Spain and the West-Indies. I suppose, this Gentleman had not consented that King Philip should have Sicily and Sardinia, and therefore takes no Notice of that Compliance of the Dutch, so far at least as not to reject it entirely, till some Pages after, when he comes to the Conferences; and to shew us something of his Authority, pag. 29. he declares, That those Conferences lasted more Weeks than they should have been suffered to do Days by which he sets himself up as sole Arbitrator of what ought to have been done, and condemns the Conduct of the States, who permitted it, and of all the other Ministers, who in all likelihood were consenting to it. Had any of those, who have incurr'd his Displeasure, and are dignify'd by him with the Titles of, prostitute Wretches, mercenary Scriblers, Libellers, &c. presum'd thus to prescribe, how long the Conferences were to last, what a Clamour would this Author have rais'd against him? The least he could expect would be

be to find himself expos'd to the Mercy of the Multitude under those agreeable Titles of *Jacobite*, *Non-Juror*, *French-Pensioner*, and others, tho' not more dangerous of a far grosser Nature. But all Things are lawful to the Saints, and one Man may better Steal a Horse than another look over the Hedge. It is the peculiar Priviledge of some to rail and find Faults with whom they please, the twentieth Part of which in others is an unpardonable Offence.

It is high time to hasten to a Conclusion, since I am not writing a Volume, which might be fill'd up, were I to take Notice of half the Contradictions and Absurdities these Letters are stuff'd with. Many following Pages are taken up with the Author's wise Observations upon the Conferences, and the Possibility or Impossibility of concluding a good Peace with *France*, which is all along treated by him with such Language, that a Man who had not heard the contrary, would be apt to believe it had been writ by some Porter, or as the *Examiner* observes of the Postscript, by *some Footman he had pick'd up among the Boys that follow the Camp, whose Character it would fit much better than that of the suppos'd Author*. And with him we may further say, *When he turns off his Footman*, we may see how far *he rest deserves to be consider'd*. The best Words he can bestow are, *The worst of Enemies, the basest; falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven*, and much more to the same effect, much below the Dignity of the Canonical Gown; and scarce tolerable from the Mouth of the most inconsiderable wretched Pettifogger. These, it must be allow'd, are Terms agreeable enough to the Rabble, if he writ, as we have Reason to imagine, only for them; but, if he had intended to be read by Gentlemen, he should have kept within the Bounds of good Manners, for fear of offending their Ears with such disagreeable Sounds. Besides, such mean malicious Bitterness, should not be heard from the Mouth, or read from the Pen, of those who ought to be all Charity, and rather to pray that

God would turn the Hearts of those they think so wicked, than to exert their Talent in reviling. If his own Profession had fail'd of instructing him, he might have learnt in the Army, that it is the Part of Men of Honour to treat their Enemies with Civility.

He makes much Noise about the *French* proposing a Partition as an Expedient for a Peace ; as if he had never heard himself of a Partition actually agreed upon before the War ; and positively affirms, the *Dutch* would consent to nothing without full Satisfaction given to all the Allies, some of which were utterly averse to a Partition of any kind. He would do well now to inform us, to what End they treated upon that Expedient ; for if they knew the Allies would not hear of it, and they were resolv'd not to conclude any Thing without them, there was not the least Occasion for any Conference upon that footing. Then he is very angry, the *French* should require them to make no farther Demands, after the Execution of the Preliminaries, than what were already contain'd in the Articles, or should be then declar'd. This I believe, to most rational Men, can seem no extravagant Request ; since, to give up strong Towns, and perform other Covenants, before they knew what was to be farther demanded, could not seem suitable with common Discretion ; and it is not to be doubted, but that, had they done it, this same Gentleman, would have represented them as much Fools, as he now labours to make them Knaves. It is usual to oblige Persons, whose Integrity is suspected, to give Security for Performance of such Covenants as are before agreed on ; but I believe it was never heard, that any Man should give Security to perform all that shall be demanded of him after such Security given. I cannot think any such Thing could be offer'd in the Conferences, or it must have been in another Nature ; for sure none but such a *Negotiator* would think of imposing such hard Terms upon a Monarch.

Pag. 50. *The Grand Project of a Universal Monarchy*
is now upon the Point of being finish'd or destroy'd. This
 Project is a meer Chimera as all the rest of this Au-
 thor's Informations, a Notion so far from being pro-
 bable, that it seems altogether impossible, and if ever
 any Nation could dream of it, they must be thought
 to be under a perfect Infatuation. Most Princes I
 beleive are willing enough to extend their Dominions,
 yet all of them too plainly see with how jealous an
 Eye their Neighbours look upon the least Increase of
 their Power, to entertain any Thoughts of rendring
 it Universal. The *Romans* indeed stretch'd out their
 Conquests very far, but that was in a Time of Barba-
 rity, when every Nation stood upon its own Feet,
 and depended on its Strength; the Case is now
 alter'd, and every one endeavours to support it self,
 with the Assistance not only of the nearest, but even
 of the remotest. All join to crush the prevailing King-
 dom. This was done when the House of *Austria* seem'd
 to be uppermost, and the same has been ever pra-
 ctis'd since that of *Bourbon* began to grow formidable.
 Besides the Way for *France* to have aim'd at this
 imaginary Universal Monarchy had been to reject the
 Offer of *Spain* made to *Philip* and to insist on it for
 the Duke of *Burgundy*, in whom the two Monarchies
 had been really united, and that might have been a
 considerable Advance towards the incorporating of
 others by Degrees. But to call that an Uniting of
 the two Crowns, because they are on the Heads of
 two Brothers is no more likely, than that every
 younger Brother should submit his Estate to the Dis-
 posal of the Elder, which I think is so far from being
 practis'd, that I am of Opinion there are but few who
 would not rather take from another, than part with
 any thing of their own. And it is well known that
 the *Spanish* Nation accepted of *Philip* on that very Prin-
 ciple, which was to prevent ever falling under the
 Dominion of *France*, or is it in the least to be que-
 tion'd but that the said *Philip* will to the utmost of
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his Power, defend what he has got, against Brother or Father, should they attempt to give Laws to him, and should he find himself too weak to oppose them, will not fail to crave the Assistance of all the Powers of Europe.

Next follows, to pass by the *Munster* Story as too remote from us, a severe Invektive against *some Men*, Pag. 53 and 54. *Who had Work to be done which could not be carried on without a Peace; — and 'twas much to their Purpose to have a Ferment in the Nation; and nothing can save the Nation from the Dangers some Men would bring it into, &c.* Here are mighty Innuendo's, a great Cry and little Wool. Nay this is putting the Nation into a Ferment, to tell them of such pernicious Men, and such imminent Dangers, which no Man knows of but himself. If he knows of such Men it is his Duty to discover them, that so the Dangers may be prevented, or he will be as guilty as the Actors; or if he knows not, why does he endeavour to cause Distractions by the Apprehension of imaginary Perils.

How insupportable is the Conceitedness of this Writer all along, and again p. 57. where he imposes his strange Fancies on the Reader, with *'Tis probable the French Ministers either Blecour or Ibberville, or some other of their Emissaries had pretended to treat with some of the Grandees, and for what? But to try whether they would abandon their King, and this Trick we must believe is extremely probable, and possibly they went further, and that in Concert with the French, to save the King's Honour they agreed to seize his Person and carry him off.* What a shameful Story is here rais'd upon the bare Credit of *it is probable and possibly*, without the least Ground for this extravagant Possibility and Probability, but that the Duke of *Medina Celi* was seiz'd for a Design against the King. And this Practice for ought he knows was carried on by *Blecour* or *Ibberville*, or any body else, for he neither knows nor cares, so his idle Supposition may but inculcate something.

I am so weary of speaking to these Absurdities that must beg your Lordship's Pardon for leaving off perhaps something abruptly, for no Patience can enable Man to dwell so long upon so ungrateful a Subject. Yet before I conclud, I must take Notice of his Expressions *Pag. 64.* which I think are not only groundless, but audacious; for there speaking of the D. of M. he says he is afraid he cannot do so much, because *the Enemies are encourag'd, the Allies full of Jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd, uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, vilely misrepresented to the People, without Interest at home, without Authority in the Army,* with much more of this nameless Bombast, so scandalous that there is no need of making any Reflection on it. Then *Pag. 66.* *What Villany was it to try by Lies and Calumnies to ruin him, who could not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him.* This Expression alone sufficiently exposes the Author's Folly, to say no worse, in that he hangs the Fate of the Nation upon so small a Thread as the Life or Grandeur of a Single Person, which as it is the highest piece of Flattery on the one Hand, so it is no less a Slander and Reproach upon all deserving Men on the other.

I was before tir'd, but this I must confess has somewhat provok'd me, for after all he has rail'd against encouraging our Enemies, I think nothing could have been said more effectual that way, than to tell the World there is but one single Man between us and Ruin. I will therefore rid my Hands of this Writer at once, begging Pardon for having been so tedious, and subscribe my self

Your Lordship's

Most Obedient Servant.

Lingua mali pars pessima servi. Juvenal, Sat. 9.

A Paper being sent me, call'd, *An Answer to the Examination of the Management of the War*, by the *Medley's* Footman, I read it at the farther end of the Yard, where it could be put to the proper Use. As for the Author, he might have spar'd giving us his Title, which any Man might have guess'd at by his Style. When the Slaves rebell'd against the Ancient *Scythians*, their Masters laid down their Arms, and attack'd them with Lashes. The proper Reply to a foul-mouth'd Footman is a Cudgel, or a Horse-Whip. There are Footmen who have Sense and Manners; but this seems to be the same Fellow the *Examiner* told us, the Manager had pick'd up in the Army; who being there us'd to marauding, in *English*, filching, has stolen some of his Master's Notes to patch up a scurvy Sheet for the Press; unless we will believe the Master and the Man are the same, which must be so, if we may credit this Writer; because he tells us, the Letter-Writer, in a Postscript, recommended himself to his Protection; but that was to the Protection of the *Medley*, and not of his Footman; which is a Demonstration, that the Two pretended Persons are the same; and thus we see the Man is the Master, and *vice versa*. He concludes. He has condescended thus far to protect the *Letter-Writer*; the Condescension and Protection of a Footman are very singular and honourable. It is more like Impudence in a Fellow, who owns that Post, to call the *Examiner* by the familiar Name of his Friend; but it is natural for such as have been almost naked to be Saucy, when they get into a new Livery; I shall therefore take no more Notice of him, any farther, than to commit him, if he presumes to Scribble again, to the Correction of the Beadle.

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